From the category archives:

Five-minute lawyer

“Joint venture” is a sloppy term used to describe a number of different business operations. The important thing to remember is that it is too vague to be meaningful legally.

A project that is called a joint venture might legitimately be structured like any of these:

  • a brand new entity with shared ownership
  • a subsidiary of one partner
  • a ‘project’ with some shared or contributed resources

The differences between these are huge, and yet there’s no right answer without knowing the specifics of any situation. Well, I take that back: the *right* answer is knowing what you want, what you’re dealing with, and how to figure out if there’s a good fit between the two. If I had to pick a default answer, I’d say always form a new company so that everything that’s in the box is in the box, who owns what’s in the box is easy to figure out, and the rules about the box are well-known and clear to everyone, inside and out.

Someone recently asked “what is an equity share profit interest?” in a joint venture?

The specifics matter greatly, including the language of the terms, the type of entity, if any, that the joint venture is, and what is intended.

Usually, however, someone using the phrase “profit interest’ should mean that there is an interest in a piece of the profits that does not include ownership rights (or responsibilities) in the joint venture entity itself. This type of structure, like phantom equity, shadow equity, or other stock-option equivalents or even dual-classed common stock, is designed to separate the returns on the business from the ownership and control of the business. And most people don’t really care: they want the portion of the money that their stake represents as if it were true equity ownership. But many people don’t vote their shares in big publicly held companies nor do they want to be engaged in day-to-day management. Accenture and KPMG Consulting are two companies that come to mind where stock option equivalents were used as part of employee compensation.

Back to joint ventures: the idea of a profit-only stake might be appropriate when the joint venture doesn’t have a separate existence. It might be a true project operated by two or more companies: there’s no way to give anyone ownership in anything and so profits are all that can be shared. Or someone might be a much smaller participant than others who are determined to control the direction of the joint venture.

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Here’s a common set of angel-investor questions regarding a standard seed round term sheet for a tech company:

  1. Why are the shares divided into preferred and common?
  2. Why does the preferred stock have a limited “1x” return?
  3. What will happen with liquidation preferences in future rounds?
  4. What will happen with dividends?
  5. Does the preferred stock have to convert to common to get more than its money back? Why? How?
  6. Don’t these restrictions make preferred shares seem less “good?”

The short answer is that this is a standard seed round term sheet that balances all the issues in a reasonable industry-standard way that won’t hamstring follow-on rounds. What that means is that venture investors, and also their lawyers, expect to see companies with a structure that is within the normal variation of such things. The standard, as I’ve written before, is to see a Delaware C-corp with a reasonable division of equity among the founders, some sort of vesting, a clean balance sheet, and a reasonably clean cap table overall. Complications on any of these points can arise, and some variation is certainly common, and some variation is actually meaningful, purposeful, and beneficial to the company.

Of course there are two positions on each of these kinds of issues, but if you think about contracts as mechanisms for transferring risk from one party to another, then some structures make less sense because they’re economically inefficient by  not assigning a risk of loss to the person best able to prevent that loss.

Here are some longer and more precise answers:

  1. Preferred and common shares — this is the traditional structure for venture-financed companies. The two classes of stock help fine-tune the relationship between the investors and the founders in light of the risk/rewards appropriate for each. Preferred stock allows certain holders, i.e., the investors, to receive their investment back before any return accrues to the other holders, i.e., the founders. This is the general practice. The use of preferred stock also provides other high-level protections to investors even if they own less than a majority of the company, which would not be the case if they only held common stock; there are similar protections for founders holding common stock even if the preferred stock holders own a majority of the company on a fully diluted basis.
  2. The upside on the preferred shares is not limited. It is a 1x non-participating preferred. This means that the preferred stock holders have an option in the event of a liquidation event of some kind: (a) take their money back or (b) convert to common stock. The choice means that holders of preferred stock will, in the event the company is sold very early, not face a situation where they lose money and the founders make money.
  3. It is the company’s goal, and standard in the tech industry for venture-financed companies, to maintain the 1x non-participating preferred structure. Whether those terms would vary in the future for a round of venture financing with particular investors cannot be determined. But the protections of current preferred stock holders to approve certain additional issuances of preferred stock generally acts to prevent unfair future sales of stock.
  4. It is the company’s goal, and standard in the tech industry for venture-financed companies, to not actually declare and issue dividends. The basic assumption is that at the discount rates implicit in angel and venture valuations, it makes more sense for the relatively small amount of cash that dividends would represent to remain invested in the company for a far greater return. Also, since few early stage companies are producing cash, dividends are generally not distributions of free cash flow but just a deduction from cash on the balance sheet. That’s a very different corporate finance strategy, one that most startup CFOs would not suggest. The same points as it #3 regarding future rounds apply here except that dividend provisions rarely change; liquidation preferences are more likely to be different from round to round.
  5. Yes, conversion to common is generally deemed to occur immediately prior to the closing of the liquidity event, e.g, a merger or IPO. The specifics are spelled out in the transaction documents; the general format can be seen in the Series Seed documents linked below.
  6. Preferred shares are always thought of as better because they are protected on the downside. See Fred Wilson’s example in his post linked below for the basic scenario in which preferred stock investors are protected. As a general rule of thumb, in the absence of particularized 409A valuations, common shares are thought to be “worth” approximately 10% of the value of preferred shares; this ratio reflects the partial protection against downside risk that is the preferred return.

Some links:
Series Seed documents

Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures discussing the liquidation preference: he discusses the point often on his blog; it could be helpful to read his comments.

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Five-minute general counsel: Why legal advice is always custom

30 January 2011

I recently came across a LinkedIn question asking about entity selection for a social enterprise. The generic question for a generic business is what people often conceive of as an “easy question” with a simple answer. Here’s my answer: Laura, the question you ask is only properly answered in light of more important questions. I’ve [...]

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Five-minute general counsel: how to structure a board meeting

22 November 2010

Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures wrote about his board meeting and ugly travel schedule some time ago. It’s refreshing to hear him talk about being excited to go to board meetings. I’ve sat in too many where a VC (even a monster big-name guy) ended up talking about the format of financials being presented [...]

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Great lawyers don’t sell forms

17 November 2010

Here’s a LinkedIn question about LLC operating agreements. The poster wonders whether the operating agreement he received from the entity formation company is a little “generic” and asks the forum for specific advice about what should be included. The answers point to some provisions that should be included (division of gains and losses, breakup/buyout/dissolution schemes, [...]

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Five-minute general counsel: what nonprofits want

15 October 2010

Nancy Lublin’s column in Fast Company is always interesting, even moreso when I disagree with her. A column from February, “We Really Need to Talk,” (oddly renamed on the web as “Foundations’ Four Biggest Faux Pas”) is a little list of four points she’d make to foundations. To me, they boil down to versions of [...]

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Five-minute general counsel: can a nonprofit change mission?

15 October 2010

This LinkedIn question asked about mission drift for non-profits. There are a couple different layers of answer, depending on what’s going on and who’s asking. First, the fundamental concern: will the change of mission jeopardize nonprofit status (and that typically means jeopardize 501(c)(3) status, which means deductibility of donations by donors)? The answer depends on [...]

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Draft better contracts by paying attention to words

12 October 2010

This post on the use of the term immediately, one of many similar explorations by Ken Adams, is the sort of thing that attracts me to contract drafting. There is a lot to be said for using the right language to convey an idea: language that is clear, concise, hard to misconstrue, and simple without [...]

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Five-minute general counsel: should I be a social enterprise?

9 September 2010

Here’s a question on quasi-nonprofits that I’ve been hearing more often: Do I need to have a nonprofit status to become a social entrepreneurial enterprise? I found this LinkedIn question to be interesting for two reasons: first, it’s very related to a nonprofit question I field all the time, and second, I have a current [...]

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Five-minute general counsel: when should I consider a convertible bridge?

5 September 2010

I have more than one client currently considering convertible bridge notes as a parallel angel/seed round funding technique, and I have one who recently closed a small convertible note that will convert in the upcoming seed round. What’s a convertible bridge note? A convertible bridge note is a not-uncommon financing instrument in venture capital. This [...]

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